Jonathan Schaffer

 I teach at Rutgers University, where I
 am a Distinguished Professor in the 
 Department of Philosophy.

 

 My research focuses on metaphysics,
 but often strays into epistemology,
 language, mind, and science.

 

 (I'm the one on the right.)

Rutgers Philosophy


 

Curriculum Vitae




schaffer0 [at] icloud.com

 Papers

  1. Social Construction as Grounding; Or: Fundamentality for Feminists, a Reply to Barnes and Mikkola final draft, Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
    Synopsis: Reply to Barnes's and Mikkola's criticisms that grounding undermines feminist metaphysics, claiming that grounding helps clarify the idea of social construction
    Topics: Grounding, Feminism, Social ontology

     
  2. It is the Business of Laws to Govern draft of 7/26/16
    Synopsis: There is no "Inference Problem" for non-Humeans about lawhood
    Topics: Lawhood, Humeanism

     
  3. The Ground Between the Gaps draft of 8/22/16, Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming)
    Synopsis: Grounding meets zombies! Argument that explanatory gaps are everywhere, and bridged by grounding principles
    Topics: Grounding, Consciousness 

     
  4. Ground Rules: Lessons from Wilson final draft, Composition and Ground, eds. Aizawa and Gillett: Palgrave-MacMillan (forthcoming)
    Synopsis: Reply to Wilson's critique of grounding, claiming that structural equation models provide a more informative conception of grounding
    Topics: Grounding

     
  5. Quantum Holism: Nonseparability as Common Ground (with Jenann Ismael) draft of 1/27/16, Synthese (forthcoming)
    Synopsis: Attempt to clarify a rationale and meaning for quantum holism
    Topics: Quantum mechanics, Grounding, Monism

     
  6. Cause without Default (with Thomas Blanchard) final draft, Making a Difference, eds. Beebee, Hitchcock, and Price: Oxford (forthcoming)
    Synopsis: Critical discussion of the Menzies-Hall-Halpern-Hitchcock idea that causal models need to be supplemented with a default/deviant distinction
    Topics: Causation

     
  7. Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking final draft, Goldman and his Critics, eds. Kornblith and McLaughlin: Wiley-Blackwell (forthcoming)
    Synopsis: Discussion of the relevance of cognitive science to metaphysics, and the roles that both need to play in debunking intuitions
    Topics: Methodology, Meta-metaphysics

     
  8. Folk Mereology is Teleological (with David Rose) final draft, Noûs (forthcoming); expanded versionExperimental Philosophy and Metaphysics, ed. Rose: Bloomsbury (forthcoming)
    Synopsis: Experimental results suggesting that people think that composition occurs when the plurality has a purpose, and supporting a dismissive take on folk intuitions
    Topics: Experimental philosophy, Mereology, Folk metaphysics

     
  9. Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws (with Michael Townsen Hicks) final draft, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
    Synopsis: Argument that physics routinely invokes derivative properties, in ways supporting deflationary conceptions of lawhood
    Topics: Fundamentality, Lawhood

     
  10. Grounding in the Image of Causation Philosophical Studies 173 (2016), 49-100
    Synopsis: A formalism for grounding based on structural equation models
    Topics: Grounding, Causation

     
  11. What Not to Multiply without Necessity Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2015), 644-64
    Synopsis: Argument that it is only fundamental entities that are not to be multiplied without necessity
    Topics: Meta-Metaphysics, Fundamentality

     
  12. Lewis on Knowledge Ascriptions A Companion to David Lewis, eds. Loewer and Schaffer (2015), 473-90: Wiley-Blackwell
    Synopsis: Critical discussion of Lewis's contextualist relevant alternatives theory
    Topics: Knowledge, Contextualism

     
  13. Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes (with Wesley Buckwalter) Noûs 49 (2015), 201-34
    Synopsis: Opinionated "state of the art" on experimental results about stakes, concluding that (all else equal) stakes do not affect knowledge ascription.
    Topics: Experimental philosophy, Subject-sensitive invariantism

     
  14. Epistemic Comparativism: A Contextualist Semantics for Knowledge Ascriptions (with Zoltán Gendler Szabó), Philosophical Studies 168 (2014), 491-543
    Synopsis: Attempt to provide a plausible semantics for epistemic contextualism, on the model of adverbial quantification
    Topics: Semantics, Contextualism, Contrastive knowledge

     
  15. Review of Sider's Writing the Book of the World Philosophical Review 123 (2014), 125-9
    Synopsis: Review of Sider's book, arguing that there is a mismatch between two senses of 'structure' 
    Topics: Meta-metaphysics, Grounding

     
  16. Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief (with David Rose) Philosophical Studies 166 (2013), S19-S50
    Synopsis: Reply to Myers-Schulz and Schwitgebel's experimental results on knowledge without belief, and new results supporting entailment for dispositional belief
    Topics: Experimental philosophy, Knowledge, Belief

     
  17. Metaphysical Semantics Meets Multiple Realizability Analysis Reviews 73 (2013), 736-51
    Synopsis: Critical discussion of Sider's notion of metaphysical semantics, focusing on the multiple realizability of nonfundamental truths by fundamental facts
    Topics: Meta-metaphysics, Grounding

     
  18. The Action of the Whole Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (2013), 67-87
    Synopsis: Argument that the cosmos is the one and only fundamental thing, since it is the one and only thing that evolves by the fundamental laws
    Topics: Monism, Substance

     
  19. Causal Contextualism Contrastivism in Philosophy, ed. Blaauw (2012), 35-63Routledge
    Synopsis: Argument that the context sensitivity of causal ascriptions is best understood in a contrastive framework
    Topics: Contextualism, Contrastive causation

     
  20. Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed (with Joshua Knobe), Noûs 46 (2012), 675-708
    Synopsis: Discussion of existing experimental results on knowledge ascriptions, and new results favoring a contrastive model
    Topics: Experimental philosophy, Contrastive knowledge

     
  21. Grounding, Transitivity, and Contrastivity Grounding and Explanation, eds. Correia and Schnieder (2012), 122-38: Cambridge
    Synopsis: Counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding, plus sketch of a contrastive resolution
    Topics: Grounding

     
  22. Why the World has Parts: Reply to Horgan & Potrc Spinoza on Monism, ed. Goff (2012), 77-91: Palgrave
    Synopsis: Reply to Horgan & Potrc's defense of existence monism over priority monism
    Topics: Monism

     
  23. Necessitarian Propositions Synthese 189 (2012), 119-62
    Synopsis: Is there any good reason to think that propositions are eternal (time-specific), which does not provide parallel reason to think that propositions are necessary (world-specific)?
    Topics: Semantics, Propositions

     
  24. Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann The Concept of Knowledge, ed. Tolksdorf (2012), 411-24: De Gruyter
    Synopsis: Reply to Baumann's critical discussion of my "Contrastive Knowledge" (headed by a short introductory piece called "What is Contrastivism?", 353-6)
    Topics: Contrastive knowledge

     
  25. Disconnection and Responsibility: On Moore's Causation and Responsibility Legal Theory 18 (2012), 399-435
    Synopsis: Critical discussion of Moore's book, focusing on the status of omissions
    Topics: Causation in the law, Absence causation

     
  26. Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals Epistemic Modality, eds. Egan and Weatherson (2011), 179-226: Oxford
    Synopsis: Defense of a contextualist view of taste predicates and epistemic modals
    Topics: Semantics, Contextualism

     
  27. Contrastive Causation in the Law Legal Theory 16 (2010), 259-97
    Synopsis: Application of the contrastive view of causation to causation in the law (with a focus on liability in common law)
    Topics: Contrastive causation, Causation in the law

     
  28. The Internal Relatedness of All Things Mind 119 (2010), 341-76
    Synopsis: Attempt to revive the core neo-Hegelian argument for monism, based on universal internal relatedness
    Topics: Monism

     
  29. Review of Price and Corry's Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality Mind 119 (2010), 844-8
    Synopsis: Review of Price and Corry's anthology
    Topics: Causation

     
  30. The Debasing Demon Analysis 70 (2010), 228-37
    Synopsis: Discussion of skeptical doubts involving the basing requirement, imperiling even the Cartesian cogito
    Topics: Skepticism

     
  31. The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010), 307-24
    Synopsis: Defense of the idea that the world is the one and only (ultimate) truthmaker
    Topics: Truthmaking, Monism

     
  32. Monism: The Priority of the Whole Philosophical Review 119.1 (2010), 31-76 (reprinted in Spinoza on Monism, ed. Goff (2012), 9-50: Palgrave)
    Synopsis: Discussion of the issue between (priority) monists and pluralists, and defense of (priority) monism
    Topics: Monism

     
  33. The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson's Ordinary Objects Philosophical Books 50.3 (2009), 142-57
    Synopsis: Critical discussion of Thomasson's book, arguing for a grounding-based metaontology (as in "On What Grounds What") over a deflationary metaontology
    Topics: Meta-metaphysics

     
  34. Spacetime the One Substance Philosophical Studies 145.1 (2009), 131-48
    Synopsis: Arguments for monistic substantivalism (supersubstantivalism) over dualistic substantivalism (substantival spacetime plus distinct material substances)
    Topics: Spacetime, Monism

     
  35. Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard and Kallestrup Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78.2 (2009), 477-500
    Synopsis: Replies to Brogaard's and Kallestrup's critical discussions of my "Knowing the Answer"
    Topics: Contrastive knowledge, Knowledge-wh

     
  36. On What Grounds What Metametaphysics, eds. Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman (2009), 347-83: Oxford (selected as one of the ten best articles published in philosophy in 2009 and reprinted by Philosopher’s Annual 29, eds. Grim, Charlow, Gallow, and Herold; also reprinted in Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. Kim, Korman, and Sosa (2011), 73-96: Blackwell.)
    Synopsis: Conception of metaphysics as primarily concerned with questions of grounding rather than existence
    Topics: Meta-metaphysics, Grounding

     
  37. Knowledge in the Image of Assertion Philosophical Issues 18.1 (2008), 1-19
    Synopsis: Stalnaker's view of the nature of assertion + Williamsons's knowledge account of assertion = my contrastive view of knowledge
    Topics: Assertion, Contrastive knowledge

     
  38. Truth and Fundamentality: On Merrick's Truth and Ontology Philosophical Books 49.4 (2008), 302-16
    Synopsis: Critical discussion of Merrick's book, arguing for an understanding of truthmaking via grounding rather than necessitation
    Topics: Truthmaking, Grounding

     
  39. The Contrast Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions Social Epistemology 22.3 (2008), 235-45
    Synopsis: Can a binary (non-contrastive) account of knowledge explain the contrast sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions?
    Topics: Contrastive knowledge

     
  40. Review of Hüttemann's What's Wrong with Microphysicalism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59.2 (2008), 253-7
    Synopsis: Review of Hüttemann's book, arguing that the main arguments support monism (macrophysicalism) rather than Hüttemann's own egalitarian view
    Topics: Physicalism, Monism

     
  41. Truthmaker Commitments Philosophical Studies 141.1 (2008), 7-19
    Synopsis: Distinction between existence commitments (understood through quantification) and fundamentality commitments (understood through truthmaking)
    Topics: Truthmaking, Ontological commitment

     
  42. Monism Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007)
    Synopsis: Overview of metaphysical monisms, and discussions of existence monism (exactly one thing exists) and priority monism (exactly one thing is fundamental)
    Topics: Monism

     
  43. Causation and Laws of Nature: Reductionism Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, eds. Hawthorne, Sider, and Zimmerman (2007), 82-107: Blackwell
    Synopsis: Undergraduate level review of some main arguments for and against treating causation and laws as fundamental

    Topics: Causation, Lawhood, Humeanism

     
  44. Knowing the Answer Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75.2 (2007), 383-403 (awarded APA Article Prize, 2008)
    Synopsis: Argument for a contrastive view of knowledge based on knowledge-wh constructions
    Topics: Contrastive knowledge, Knowledge-wh

     
  45. Review of Dowe and Noordhof's Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58.4 (2007), 869-74
    Synopsis: Review of Dowe and Noordhof's anthology
    Topics: Causation

     
  46. From Nihilism to Monism Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85.2 (2007), 175-91 (awarded AJP Best Paper Award, 2008)
    Synopsis: Arguments that the mereological nihilist should prefer one big extended simple (existence monism) over many small simples
    Topics: Mereology, Monism

     
  47. Closure, Contrast, and Answer Philosophical Studies 133.2 (2007), 233-55
    Synopsis: How should a contrastivist understand epistemic closure?
    Topics: Contrastive knowledge, Epistemic closure

     
  48. Deterministic Chance? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58.2 (2007), 113-40
    Synopsis: Arguments that determinism is incompatible with robust objective chances (other than 0 or 1)
    Topics: Determinism, Chance

     
  49. The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism Philosophical Studies 127.1 (2006), 87-107
    Synopsis: Criticisms of subject-sensitive invariantism as an alternative to contextualism
    Topics: Subject-sensitive invariantism, Contextualism

     
  50. Contrastive Causation Philosophical Review 114.3 (2005), 327-58
    Synopsis: Defense of a (doubly) contrastive view of causation, on which causal relations have the form: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*
    Topics: Contrastive causation

     
  51. Contrastive Knowledge Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1, eds. Gendler and Hawthorne (2005), 235-71: Oxford (reprinted in The Concept of Knowledge, ed. Tolksdorf (2012), 357-94: De Gruyter)
    Synopsis: Defense of, a contrastive view of knowledge, on which the knowledge relation has the form: s knows that p rather than q
    Topics: Contrastive knowledge

     
  52. What Shifts? Thresholds, Standards, or Alternatives? Contextualism in Philosophy, eds. Preyer and Peter (2005), 115-30: Oxford
    Synopsis: Arguments that contextualists should work with relevant alternatives rather than thresholds for justification (Cohen) or distance of tracking (DeRose)
    Topics: Contextualism

     
  53. Quiddistic Knowledge Philosophical Studies 123.1-2 (2005), 1-32 (reprinted in Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, eds. Jackson and Priest (2004), 210-30: Oxford)
    Synopsis: Is the relation between properties and powers contingent or necessary, and if contingent how can we know what the properties are?
    Topics: Properties, Knowledge

     
  54. From Contextualism to Contrastivism Philosophical Studies 119.1 (2004), 73-103
    Synopsis: Arguments for a contrastive view of knowledge as resolving problems for (indexicalist) contextualism
    Topics: Contextualism, Contrastive Knowledge

     
  55. Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, ed. Hitchcock (2004), 197-216: Blackwell
    Synopsis: Arguments for absence causation (extending my earlier "Causation by Disconnection")
    Topics: Absence causation

     
  56. Counterfactuals, Causal Independence, and Conceptual Circularity Analysis 64.4 (2004), 299-309
    Synopsis: Sketch of a Lewisian view of counterfactuals with causal information in the similarity metric, and discussion of whether any problematic circularity looms
    Topics: Counterfactuals, Conceptual analysis

     
  57. Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85.1 (2004), 92-102
    Synopsis: Are the sparse properties the fundamental properties or the scientific (including higher-level) properties?
    Topics: Properties

     
  58. Of Ghostly and Mechanical Events Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68.1 (2004), 230-44
    Synopsis: Critical discussion of Pietroski's Causing Actions, defending a non-reductive layered metaphysics
    Topics: Philosophy of Mind, Reductionism

     
  59. Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69.1 (2004), 138-55 (awarded Young Epistemologist Prize, 2002)
    Synopsis: Argument that skepticism plus Gricean mechanisms (involving hyperbole) can explain knowledge ascriptions better than Lewisian contextualism
    Topics: Skepticism, Contextualism

     
  60. The Metaphysics of Causation Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003, revised 2007)
    Synopsis: Overview of metaphysical issues concerning the causal relata and the causal relation
    Topics: Causation

     
  61. Is There a Fundamental Level? Noûs 37.3 (2003), 498-517
    Synopsis: Defense of the possibility of gunk and discussion of its reprecussions for reductive metaphysics
    Topics: Mereology, Reductionism

     
  62. Overdetermining Causes Philosophical Studies 114.1 (2003), 23-45
    Synopsis: Arguments that each individual overdetermining factor is causal
    Topics: Causation, Overdetermination

     
  63. The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66.1 (2003), 125-38
    Synopsis: Can a thing have mass but no other property? The question of whether there are necessary connections between properties
    Topics: Properties

     
  64. Principled Chances British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54.2 (2003), 27-41
    Synopsis: Account of chance that is Humean, while avoiding undermining and allowing non-zero chances to be realizable (but is not quite the quantity found in the laws, and is not stable across duplicate trials)
    Topics: Chance, Humeanism

     
  65. Perceptual Knowledge Derailed Philosophical Studies 112.1 (2003), 31-45
    Synopsis: Arguments that tracking theories of knowledge cannot handle perceptual knowledge
    Topics: Knowledge, Perception

     
  66. Causes as Probability-Raisers of Processes Journal of Philosophy 98.2 (2001), 75-92
    Synopsis: Proposed analysis of causation via raising the probability of the effect-process, attempting to synthesize probability-raising and process-linkage views
    Topics: Causation

     
  67. Causation, Influence, and Effluence Analysis 61.4 (2001), 11-19
    Synopsis: Criticism of Lewis's influence account of causation
    Topics: Causation

     
  68. The Individuation of Tropes Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79.2 (2001), 247-57
    Synopsis: Argument that trope theorists should individuate tropes by location
    Topics: Tropes

     
  69. Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives, and Missed Clues Analysis 61.3 (2001), 202-08
    Synopsis: Counterexample to Lewis's account of knowledge (perhaps best resolved by a requirement of properly based belief)
    Topics: Causation

     
  70. Review of Dowe's Physical Causation British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52.4 (2001), 809-13
    Synopsis: Review of Dowe's book
    Topics: Causation

     
  71. Causation by Disconnection Philosophy of Science 67.2 (2000), 285-300 (awarded Philosophy of Science Recent Ph.D. Essay Contest, 2001)
    Synopsis: Argument for a specific sort of absence causation, making trouble for process-linkage accounts of causation
    Topics: Causation, Absence causation

     
  72. Overlappings: Probability-Raising without Causation Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78.1 (2000), 40-46
    Synopsis: Counterexample to the sufficiency of probability-raising accounts of causation
    Topics: Causation

     
  73. Trumping Preemption Journal of Philosophy 97.4 (2000), 165-181 (reprinted in Causation and Counterfactuals, eds. Collins, Hall, and Paul (2004), 59-73: MIT Press)
    Synopsis: A special sort of preemption counterexample to counterfactual accounts of causation
    Topics: Causation